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Four years ago, while planning a collection of essays on the history of transatlantic crises, 
my colleague Mario Del Pero and I soon came to the conclusion that we could not devote a 
chapter to each crisis: there had been simply too many, or too few, depending on the definition. 
More importantly, separating moments of crisis from periods of uneventful agreement in the 
history of the Atlantic alliance appeared virtually impossible. A plain, linear pattern of peaceful 
continuity punctuated by occasional crises does not really represent the dynamic of the Atlantic 
alliance. When you travel through its sixty years’ history, what you see instead is a more complex 
fabric, a never-ending story of big and small clashes, negotiated differences, divergences, 
convergences. Thus we opted for decades, each one with its own chapter. If you read them you 
find out that each author portrays a complex dynamic of differences and mediations, 
disagreements and accords1. 
The point I want to make here is that the most appropriate term is not so much crisis 
but challenges, and mutual adjustments. Crisis, however, was the term often voiced in anguish 
by commentators and by the Alliance’s leaders and officers, who had to patch up their 
disagreements without knowing if they could really preserve or restore unity. If the overall, 
shared mission of containing and deterring Soviet power was never in doubt, everything else — 
policies, organization, tactics, budgeting, and the internal balance of influence — was in constant 
flux, subject to permanent renegotiation. This is, I believe, the keyword. Although stable in their 
overall framework, transatlantic relations never stood still, and they amounted to a permanent 
process of renegotiation. 
Let me go through a concise overview. In its very first years, when the Alliance’s basic 
strategy and structure were being devised in an atmosphere of emergency, the thorny issue of 
German rearmament cut through each and every debate, from 1949 to the solution eventually 
adopted in 1955. It affected strategy as well as identity, the internal balance of national interests 
and the multilateral functioning of the Alliance. It could easily have ripped NATO apart. 
Instead, the very process of searching for a complex solution gave NATO partners a habit for 
mutual concessions, procedures to handle differences, and ultimately a durable architecture that 
integrated national, European and American interests. On this and other issues, Europeans 
learnt to adjust to harsh post-war realities, to cooperate while also competing for influence. 
While the Americans acquired the ability to lead the Alliance not only by their sheer 
preponderance but also by means of accommodating European interests and sensibilities2. 
Precious resources, both of them, for the solidity and functioning of a multilateral alliance. 
Just a year after the solution of the German issue, in 1956, the three leading nations of 
the Atlantic alliance went to a head-on collision on Suez, and Washington forced its best allies to 
abandon, once and for all, the imperial pretensions that had defined their very identity as nations 
and international powers3. 
NATO as such was not involved, but from the lessons of Suez originated the next, 
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major challenge to its unity. Britain opted for a closer, permanent alignment with Washington. 
De Gaulle instead imagined a French-led European coalition aimed at reducing US 
preponderance and rebalancing the uneven distribution of power within the Western alliance. 
The instruments of choice for his strategy were close cooperation with Germany, an 
independent nuclear deterrent and a closely-knit European community without Britain4. Step by 
step, and all the way to France’s exit from NATO in 1966, the alliance was rocked by increasing 
tensions that concerned not only the role of France, but strategy towards the USSR, the 
potential proliferation of national deterrents, burden- sharing and monetary policies, US policies 
in Indochina. 
Lifted by the tide of its economic “miracle”, Western Europe was growing confident and 
assertive in those years. It often challenged the US on commercial and financial issues, and was 
surely interested at some rebalancing within NATO. But De Gaulle’s nationalism and the 
persistent need for American security guarantees eventually isolated France. President Johnson 
did not retaliate against French defiance; Germany and other European governments did not 
join in the challenge to US leadership; policy issues were successfully mediated in the Harmel 
report of 1967. In short, NATO not only survived the challenge, but gained in cohesion, 
resilience and strategic accord5. 
By the late 1960s the Alliance was morphing into a less unequal coalition, and not just 
because the US had trapped itself in an exhausting war in Vietnam that few allies deemed wise 
or necessary. The long post-war boom had turned Western Europe from the epitome of 
fragmented weakness – as it used to be in 1945 – into a prosperous, modernized, self-confident 
coalition of states, whose solidity was only momentarily shaken by the tremors of 1968. On 
monetary and commercial affairs, they were challenging the US to fiscal self-discipline and closer 
transatlantic coordination. They wanted the US to remain committed to European security, but 
they were also beginning to redefine the very notion of continental security. Led by the 
pioneering efforts of Willy Brandt’s Germany, most European governments got involved in one 
sort or another of an Ostpolitik premised on the idea that an intra-European détente could not 
only stabilize the continent and strengthen peace, but induce a gradual relaxation of Soviet rule 
in Eastern Europe6. 
Thus, throughout the 1970s the management of the Atlantic alliance became dicey, as a 
complex set of interlocking negotiations – with open clashes and bitter disagreements – 
multiplied uncertainty and unpredictability. The Atlantic alliance grew contentious and fractious, 
its voices strident. Monetary affairs were a source of constant tension, as Nixon’s decision to 
sink the Bretton Woods system signalled an attempt to re-establish American hegemony in a far 
less accommodating fashion. The Europeans broke ranks with the US during the Yom Kippur 
war, and thereafter adopted a noticeably more pro-Arab stance, as a well as a different oil policy. 
On the North-South axis, they developed trade and aid programs that projected Europe’s own 
interests and influence, and often contested US policies in the Third World, especially in Latin 
America. Kissinger’s attempt at re-disciplining NATO under American leadership was 
noticeably less successful that his triangular diplomacy. 
As the emerging American neoconservatives denounced a creeping “finlandization” of 
Western Europe, Europeans decided that a distinct identity and a more independent attitude in 
foreign affairs were now possible and necessary. Under the umbrella of bipolar détente, Europe 
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was actually organizing its first foreign policy coordination and played a central role in injecting 
human rights and cultural openness in the Helsinki agreements. Transitions to democracy in 
Southern Europe – Greece, Portugal, Spain – were channelled and managed not by the US but 
by the increasing pull of the European Community. And as soon as détente began to fray, 
European and American priorities openly diverged. Washington groped for new leverage to 
compel the Soviets, but European governments refused to halt or even to downgrade intra-
European détente7. 
Crisis, mistrust, divergence were the most common definitions of the transatlantic -
relationship during the 1970s. And yet NATO did not break apart, cooperation did not stop, 
and at the end of the decade important agreements – most noticeably on the deployment of 
Pershing and Cruise missiles – signalled a restored, and perhaps strengthened compact across 
the Atlantic. Europe’s search for autonomy did not extend to security issues, and renewed 
Soviet military pressures in Europe – as well as assertiveness in Africa and elsewhere – called for 
refurbished Atlantic unity under US strategic leadership. As bipolar détente gave way to 
confrontation, the transatlantic alliance ended a stormy phase ... and immediately entered 
another one! Solid realignment on military issues lasted through the 1980s, but it was 
accompanied by open conflicts on economic matters, explicit mistrust on many policy issues and 
an increasingly diversified attitude on relations with the Soviet bloc. 
Ronald Reagan’s ideological offensive against communism, his counter-attacks on the 
periphery of the Soviet empire and his strategy of intense rearmament enjoyed some support in 
Western Europe, but they also raised widespread concern. Not so much for fear that we might 
stumble into war – even though governments felt the pressure of peace movements and an 
anxious public opinion – but for a distinctly European preference for détente. It was not so 
much a matter of principles as of established practices. Increasing trade, continuous credit and 
expanding contacts with the East were seen in Bonn, but also in many other West European 
capitals, as assets that should not be sacrificed. There were material interests at stake, of course, 
but there was more than that. Furthering intra-European détente was a strategic choice. 
Offering inducements and incentives as well as constraints; developing contacts, travelling, 
cultural exchanges; establishing common standards, these were all viewed as means to mellow 
down the rigidities of Communist rule, raise the price of self-imposed isolation and, ultimately, 
draw the East closer to the West. If the West had to rearm to face down Soviet pressure – and 
Europeans went along with the US on this – no less important appeared the attempt to gradually 
foster the political, psychological and even ideological disarmament – so to speak – of the 
Eastern regimes8. 
Thus, West Europeans did not join in the post-Afghanistan boycott of the USSR 
promoted by the Carter administration, opted for moderating rather than ostracizing the military 
regime imposed by general Jaruzelski in Poland, and openly defied Washington by collaborating 
with the Soviets in building a gas pipeline from Siberia. Although strained, NATO unity was 
maintained, and its military effectiveness increased, but the Atlantic alliance of the 1980s 
appeared less a unitary bloc than a contentious coalition between two uneasy partners with 
diverging views. As conservative America took to emphasizing its superior power and distinctive 
neo-liberal ideology, Europeans increasingly valued multilateral collaboration – within and 
without the Alliance – and responded by portraying themselves as the successful embodiment of 
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a more regulated and cooperative model of market economy9. 
In the final, hectic years that brought the Cold War to its end, it was the Americans who 
drove the hard bargaining with Gorbachev for the factual, ideological and moral disarmament 
(and eventually the dismemberment) of Soviet power. But it was West Germany and the 
European community that literally bought off the Eastern regimes, channelling Poland and 
Hungary into the “negotiated revolutions” that started the peaceful upheaval of 1989, and 
making clear to the hard-liners in Berlin and Prague that the cost of resistance would have been 
unsustainable. The decisive, crucial cooperation between President Bush and Chancellor Kohl 
on German reunification once again epitomized this two-pronged action – pressure and 
inducements, compulsion and subsidies – by allies who used different means, and extolled 
different philosophies, only to converge on a common goal10.  
Then came the post-Soviet era, and each partner had to re-conceive what the Atlantic 
alliance was all about. Each one brought its specific reading of the Cold War experience to bear. 
The US emphasized the transformative agency of American power, and its role as the 
indispensable guarantor of security in Europe and worldwide, a view corroborated by the crisis 
in the former Yugoslavia. Europeans, on the other hand, stressed the stabilizing effects of 
integration and multilateral cooperation, the constraining power of international norms and 
shared procedures11. 
NATO retained a useful function in both visions, respectively as a multiplier of US 
influence and a “security community” that epitomized cooperation. Besides, abandoning a 
functioning arrangement for the unknown would have been unnecessarily expensive, risky and 
uncertain. But throughout the Nineties it was becoming apparent that even within shared 
institutions and habits, the Atlantic alliance was not so much a unitary body as the juxtaposition 
of different attitudes and philosophies. They could coexist, no doubt. Policies could converge, 
major initiatives could occasionally unite, but outlooks and expectations were growing diverse. 
Perhaps more than anything else, Americans and Europeans no longer shared the early-Cold 
War assumption of convergence, of a shared future as a common, indistinct West. We still acted 
as one West vis-à-vis some external challenges. We were perceived as a compact by third parties, 
especially alienated and hostile ones. But we were conceiving of ourselves as Americans and 
Europeans: with similarities, of course, but also different histories, aspirations and projects12. 
It was at this moment that the Alliance precipitated in its most profound crisis. The first 
and only one, I believe, that truly threatened its existence, because the response to 9/11 
catalyzed, and above all polarized all those elements of diverse self-representation that had been 
                                                 
9 A. Deighton - G. Bossuat (eds.), The EC/EU: A World Security Actor?, Paris, 2007; S. Pons - F. Romero (eds.), 
Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War, London, 2005; W. Loth, Moscow, Prague, and Warsaw: Overcoming the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, in “Cold War History”, vol. I (2001), n. 2, pp. 103-18; J. Hanhimäki, Conservative goals, revolutionary outcomes: 
the paradox of détente, in “Cold War History”, vol. VIII (2008), n. 4, pp. 503-12. 
10 M.P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, New York, 2007, pp. 338-
450; C.S. Maier, Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, Princeton, NJ, 1997; A. S. Grachev, 
Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, Cambridge, 2008; F. Bozo (et al.), Europe and the 
End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal, London, 2008; J. Levesque, 1989, la fin d'un empire: l’URSS et la liberation de l’Europe 
de l’Est, Paris, 1996; M. Kramer, The Collapse of East European Communism and the Repercussions within the Soviet Union 
(Part I), in “Journal of Cold War Studies”, vol. V (2003), n. 4, pp. 178-256; R. L. Tokes, Hungary’s Negotiated 
Revolution, 1987-1990, Cambridge, 1996; K.H. Jarausch, The Rush to German Unity, New York, 1994; P. Zelikow - C. 
Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed, Cambridge, MA, 1995. 
11 H.M. Cox, Another Transatlantic Split? American and European Narratives and the End of the Cold War, in “Cold War 
History”, vol. VII (2007), n. 2, pp. 121-46; E. Schrecker (ed.), Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History after the 
Fall of Communism, New York, 2004. 
12 R. D. Asmus, Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era, New York, 2002; J.P. Kaufman, 
NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance, Lanham, MD, 2002; J. M. Goldgeier, Not 
Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO, Washington, D.C., 1999; A. Verdun - O. Croci, The European 
Union in the Wake of Eastern Enlargement: Institutional and Policy-Making Challenges, Manchester, 2005; F. Romero, The 
Twilight of American Cultural Hegemony. A Historical Perspective on Western Europe’s Distancing from America, in D. Farber 
(ed.), What They Think of Us. International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11, Princeton, 2007, pp. 153-76. 
brewing for some time across the Atlantic. “Venus” versus “Mars”, according to Robert Kagan; 
unilateralism versus multilateralism, in academic lingo; a clash of civilization or multicultural 
coexistence, in the media. The disruptive clash on Iraq, and on broader assumptions about the 
“war on the terror” and the Middle East, concerned strategy as well as visions of the past and 
the future, and a good deal of beliefs and delusions about America’s and Europe’s role in the 
world. Conservative America felt betrayed by pusillanimous Europeans in the moment of need, 
while broad sections of European opinion, and a few of its most important governments, felt 
that we should move to an independent role for peace in a multi-polar world13. Formal NATO 
unity remained frozen in place, but for a couple of years – between late 2002 and 2004 – 
transatlantic cooperation hung on the verge of collapse. 
Then diplomats got down to their job of patching things up. Supporters of radical 
options for a post-Atlantic polarization were forced to a reality check, whether in the streets of 
Iraq or in the halls of Brussels, and backtracked. Sensible evaluations of the multitude of 
interests, similarities and connections that we share came once again to the foreground. We 
began, tentatively but effectively, to cooperate where we could, and where we could not, at least 
we stopped hitting and offending each other. At present, we seem to have adopted a pattern of 
cautious moderation; we do what we can to minimize actual or potential trans-Atlantic frictions, 
and we strive to realize collaborative synergies when possible. We recognize our conspicuous 
disagreements on many issues – from Afghanistan to Russia, from Palestine to Iran – but we do 
not exasperate them, and actively try to work a way out of our differences, or to hush them up.  
Is this anything new? Or is it once again the traditional trans-Atlantic pattern of 
negotiated cooperation, with the careful management of differences? I believe we can I draw a 
couple of conclusions from the story I sketched out.  
The first one is that trans-Atlantic differences – whether within NATO or around it – 
where constant, deep and often tense. They were the norm, not the exception. At the time they 
were always experienced as a drag, if not a danger, for Western effectiveness. But when we 
assess them in broad historical terms, we can now come – I believe – to the opposite 
conclusion. Overall, they were an asset, not a burden. Sure, at times they prevented the optimal 
conclusion, they imposed complex detours, they raised costs, and they forced officials to 
painstaking work, with frustrating delays. But differences gave the alliance a broader reach. They 
imposed more refined analyses of each problem, with precious distinctions between the 
unnecessary and the bottom-line. They multiplied the approaches the alliance could take on each 
issue, with more latitude to bring different nuances and policies to bear on the same subject 
matter. They drew the best resources out of each partner and deployed them in multisided 
approaches and interventions. Besides, they endowed the West with a powerful image of 
inclusiveness and accommodating flexibility that made it much more attractive. In short, they 
multiplied rather than limit the resources the West could deploy. 
The best example, certainly the most decisive one, concerns the management of bipolar 
relations in the final decade of the Cold War. President Reagan’s confrontational mobilization of 
US power forced the Soviets to realize that they could not sustain an endless competitive 
escalation. At the same time, intra-European détente deepened the Eastern regimes’ structural 
dependence on Western loans and imports, exposed those societies to corrosive Western 
cultural influences, facilitated the emergence of reformist attitudes, and eventually brought the 
Socialist elites themselves to lose faith in their own ideological project. Thus, what the West at 
the time perceived as a perilous lack of unity, turned out to be an unintended but highly 
effective double-play — the political equivalent of a pincer movement, to borrow a military 
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metaphor - that drove the Cold War to its unpredictably peaceful ending14.  
Compare this flexible, adaptable, plural nature of the Atlantic coalition with the dismal 
management of their alliances by the Soviets. From Yugoslavia to China, from Hungary to 
Czechoslovakia, the Kremlin’s inability to accommodate differences meant that the Communist 
one could only be a brittle bloc, hierarchical and yet cumbersome, prone to fissures, unfit for 
innovation and adaptation, quite unattractive to potential new friends15. 
My second and final conclusion is this. Throughout its history, NATO withstood open, 
even acrimonious differences. They were contained, carefully managed and eventually overcome 
because no one saw them as a spring-board to move beyond the Alliance. But in the crisis over 
Iraq a different spectre emerged. For a few brief months, differences were magnified and 
exasperated by radical voices across the Atlantic, who seemed to exploit those differences in 
order to outline alternative projects. Either an impossibly hierarchical submission to 
Washington’s unilateral strategy or a final break-up towards Europe’s solitary autonomy in a 
multi-polar architecture. This is what no alliance can withstand. If different policy options 
become tools to forge contrasting identities, if independence is valued over and above coalition, 
then even the best tradition of alliance management is powerless. 
The Atlantic alliance stepped back from that brink, and its accumulated experience at 
conflict management reasserted itself. But we had a glimpse of the dynamic that could break it 
apart, or paralyse it into irrelevance. It is a lesson that should be kept in mind. We are 
undergoing a turbulent reshaping of the world economy that will no doubt redraw the map of 
many international relations and attitudes, if not of power resources. We are also experiencing 
gradual but portentous shifts in the geometry of world power which seem to be accelerated by 
the current crisis. The transatlantic relationship will inevitably be less central, although I believe 
still very important, and will have to be reconceived and repositioned. In such a changing 
environment even the most established and successful traditions cannot be taken for granted. 
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